SASSA & NSFAS Link Checker

What each verdict means

The tool sorts every URL into one of four buckets. Match the colour you see to what to do next.

The eight official grant-related sites to memorise

Every legitimate SA government portal ends in .gov.za. NSFAS is the one common exception, ending in .org.za. If a "SASSA" URL does not end in .gov.za, it is not SASSA, no matter how professional the page looks.

The nine red flags this tool checks for

These are the URL-level patterns behind almost every SASSA / NSFAS scam we see forwarded on WhatsApp and Facebook. Each one is a rule the tool applies against the address you paste.

• Wrong domain ending

  A URL contains "sassa", "srd" or "nsfas" but the domain does not end in .gov.za or nsfas.org.za. Example: sassa-srd.co.za, srd-r370.online. This alone is a scam.

• URL shorteners

  Links that start with bit.ly, tinyurl.com, ow.ly, t.co, cutt.ly and similar. SASSA and NSFAS never shorten their own links; the full address always fits.

• Look-alike domain

  A name crafted to read like a real service but with an extra word, hyphen or number: sassa370.link, nsfas-payment.com, srd-status-check.co.za.

• Suspicious top-level domain

  Endings like .link, .click, .xyz, .top, .online, .buzz, .tk, .gq account for the majority of SA phishing pages we see.

• Raw IP address

  A number like http://196.24.10.11/apply instead of a proper domain name. Real government services publish domains, not IPs.

• Punycode / homograph

  Foreign characters that look like Latin letters. Shows up in the address as xn-- at the start of a segment (e.g. xn--sass-c4a.gov.za).

• HTTP instead of HTTPS

  Missing the padlock. Real government portals encrypt every page. If the address starts with http:// and asks for your ID, walk away.

• Deep or nested subdomains

  Structures with five or more segments (e.g. login.secure.sassa-portal.support.co.za) are sometimes used to disguise the real host after the last dot.

• Unusual protocol

  Anything other than http:// or https://, especially data: or javascript:. Legitimate services never use these for a link.

Four scam patterns behind almost every SASSA / NSFAS phish in 2026

Reader forwards, SASSA fraud alerts and our own inbox tell the same story: four templates account for the vast majority of grant-related scams in South Africa this year.

Real fake SASSA sites we have seen

Two live scam pages we investigated. Both mimic the SASSA experience closely enough that a rushed reader will type an ID number without noticing. Here is exactly what to look at before you trust the page.

Fake · not SASSA

mygrantsupport.com

"South Africa Grant Help"

• Wrong domain ending. Ends in .com. Every real SA government portal ends in .gov.za.
• Own disclaimer betrays it. The header reads "Unofficial Guide, we are NOT affiliated with the South African Social Security Agency." A real SASSA page never needs that line.
• Vague copy, aggressive CTA. "Claim your grant payment faster and easier" plus a big green "Get Status Now" is designed to hurry you past the address bar.
• ID field on an untrusted domain. Once you type your 13 digits, the operator has an ID that can be sold or used for SIM swaps.

Fake · not SASSA

sassa-check.co.za

"GRANT-SUPPORT.CO.ZA"

• Look-alike domain. Uses sassa in the name but ends in .co.za, not .gov.za. Textbook "wrong ending" pattern.
• Copied SASSA yellow. Matches the SASSA colour scheme to feel familiar. Design is not proof of authenticity.
• "Fast-track" language. SASSA has no fast-track. Every SRD application follows the same monthly means test; there is no premium queue.
• Buries the admission. One line hidden in the body reads "This is not the standard SASSA website", but the layout is designed to look official at first glance.

Paste either of these URLs into the checker at the top of the page. Both come back as Red: likely scam because they trigger the look-alike-domain and wrong-ending rules.

You already clicked and typed something. What now?

The panic reaction is understandable, but there is a clear order of operations. Follow these steps as soon as you realise the link was not legitimate.

1. Stop typing. If the page is still open, close the tab. Do not enter anything else, even a "cancel" or "back" click on their form.
2. Change any password you re-used. If the password you typed on the fake page is the same one you use for email, banking or WhatsApp, change it on those accounts now, from a different device where possible.
3. Call your bank fraud line if you typed a PIN or OTP. Every South African bank has a 24-hour fraud number on the back of your card. They can freeze cards and block outgoing payments while you talk.
4. Flag your ID at Home Affairs. If you typed your full ID number, visit www.dha.gov.za or your nearest Home Affairs office and ask for an ID misuse block, which prevents new accounts and SIM swaps against your name.
5. Check your SRD status yourself. Log into the SASSA status check and confirm no application was submitted, no cellphone number was changed and no banking detail was updated in your name.
6. Report the link and open a SAPS case. Forward the message to SASSA on [email protected] and call the fraud line 0800 701 701. If money left an account, open a case at your nearest SAPS station and keep the reference number.

Frequently asked